Month: May 2025

Lliuya v RWE. Germany’s historic climate ruling: A pyrrhic loss for claimants?

A post by guest blogger Geert Van Calster (KU Leuven)

I owe the title of this post squarely to Arie Van Hoe. The sentiment which Arie taps into, is that of most of the immediate commentary on Lliuya v RWE at the Hamm regional court, acting as court of appeal. Most of the immediate commentary notes the significant legal points scored by Mr Lliuya, even if his claim was ultimately dismissed. Consequently even in losing, the determination of the claim by the Hamm court may inflict long-lasting injuries on big greenhouse has emitters.

Background to the case is on the Sabin Center’s climate litigation database. In essence, claimant’s home is situated in the Peruvian Andes, right below a glacial lake. The gradual melting of the ice threatens to flood his home as well as that of many others. Claimant requests in essence a contribution by RWE to the costs of putting up a protective flood barrier. RWE is historically and currently an electricity generator, having used and continuing to use mostly fossil fuels in its production process. Hence it is undeniably a contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, adding to climate change.

Continue reading “Lliuya v RWE. Germany’s historic climate ruling: A pyrrhic loss for claimants?”

Boek 9 Titel 1 BW (persoonlijke zekerheden) goedgekeurd in Kamer

De plenaire vergadering van de Kamer keurde vanavond Boek 9 Titel 1 BW goed. We hernemen graag de tekst die professor Sagaert, een van de experten die aan deze tekst werkten, zo-even op LinkedIn schreef:

“Alle eer en lof voor deze hervorming zijn voor wijlen Professor Eric Dirix, die het eerste ontwerp van deze wet schreef. We hadden er veel voor over gehad om dit met hem te mogen meemaken.  Niet omwille van de persoon, maar omwille van de inhoud, die bij Eric Dirix altijd centraal moest staan. Van die inhoud durven we in bescheidenheid hopen dat die zo goed mogelijk is.”

Grondwettelijk Hof ziet geen graten in de vervaltermijn voor terugvordering eigendom bij faillissement

Arrest nr. 80/2025 van 15 mei 2025

Eerder kwam hier (zie posts door Van Hoe en Verlaeckt) aan bod hoe het Hof van Cassatie een prejudiciële vraag stelde aan het Grondwettelijk Hof over art. XX.194 WER. Dit artikel verplicht de eigenaar van goederen die in het bezit zijn van de gefailleerde (bv. een onbetaalde verkoper die eigendomsvoorbehoud heeft bedongen) tot snel handelen. Op straffe van verval moet de rechtsvordering tot terugvordering worden ingesteld voor de neerlegging van het eerste proces-verbaal tot verificatie van de schuldvorderingen.

In een arrest van vandaag 15 mei oordeelt het Grondwettelijk Hof dat Art. XX.194, al. 2 WER geen schending uitmaakt van art. 16 van de Grondwet, in samenhang gelezen met artikel 1 van het Eerste Aanvullend Protocol EVRM.

Waar voornoemde posts in hun analyse de vraag centraal stellen of de rechten van de eigenaar na een verkoop door de curator overgaan op de prijs ervan, blijft zaaksvervanging afwezig in de belangenafweging door het Grondwettelijk Hof. Voor het Hof is het voldoende dat de eigenaar, zoals wij allemaal uiteraard, het Belgisch Staatsblad zal lezen en dan voldoende tijd heeft om actie te ondernemen.

Dat verbaast omdat het Hof van Cassatie een jaartje geleden heeft geoordeeld dat voornoemde vervaltermijn ook geldt in de afwezigheid van een contractuele relatie tussen de eigenaar en de gefailleerde.

Keep calm and trust common sense: hernieuwing van een hypothecaire inschrijving blijft nodig na een faillissement volgens het Hof van Cassatie, of toch niet helemaal?

Een post door gastblogger Mr. Cedric Haspeslagh

Om het met de woorden van S. CARPENTER te zeggen: “These are fast times and fast nights. No time for rewrites”. Of iets traditioneler: ius vigilantibus est.

Dat ‘te laat te laat’ is en een schuldeiser daar soms mee moet leven, heeft een hypothecaire schuldeiser ervaren in de zaak die geleid heeft tot een cassatiearrest van 28 april 2025 (AR C.22.0419.F).

De soep hoeft evenwel niet zo heet opgegeten te worden als ze op het eerste gezicht werd opgediend.

Continue reading “Keep calm and trust common sense: hernieuwing van een hypothecaire inschrijving blijft nodig na een faillissement volgens het Hof van Cassatie, of toch niet helemaal?”

Sire, er is geen samenloop meer (Cassatie 28 april 2025)

In haar magistrale proefschrift beschrijft M. Grégoire de (gevolgen van de) samenloop als volgt (p. 28, nr. 41):

Au moment de sa réalisation, chaque créance s’empare de la part abstraite du patrimoine qui peut lui être attribuée en fonction de l’importance des autres droits en concours. La procédure consécutive ne fait que concrétiser ce partage intellectuel. L’équilibre entre les droits en concours est donc fixé, par exemple, au moment du jugement déclaratif de faillite, de l’homologation du concordat par abandon d’actif, ou encore de l’assemblée générale qui décide de la mise en liquidation de la société.

In minder elegante (eigen) bewoordingen gesteld: de samenloop legt de onderlinge rangschikking der schuldeisers vast en bepaalt wat de schuldeisers – in functie van deze rangschikking – zullen ontvangen in het kader van de relevante procedure (vgl. Dirix/de Corte, Zekerheidsrechten, p. 37, nr. 41: “Vanaf dat ogenblik [samenloop] worden de aanspraken van de schuldeisers in hun onderlinge verhouding onherroepelijk vastgelegd (het fixatiebeginsel“).

Laten we dit principe toepassen op volgende casus: op 30 juni 1983 verleent een bank een krediet aan een vennootschap. Enkele weken later (meer bepaald op 13 juli 1983) wordt de hypotheek netjes ingeschreven. Op 12 september 2011 wordt de schuldenaar failliet verklaard. De afwikkeling van het faillissement – zo gaat dat nu eenmaal – vergt enige tijd. Op 13 juli 2013 vervalt de hypothecaire inschrijving, bij gebrek aan hernieuwing. In 2016 wordt het onroerend goed verkocht. Bij de verdeling van de opbrengst ervan wordt geen rekening gehouden met de hypotheek zoals ingeschreven op 13 juli 1983. Quid?

Wanneer we teruggrijpen naar de inleidende citaten is het antwoord helder: op 12 september 2011, dag van het openvallen van het faillissement, was er wel degelijk een aan de boedel tegenstelbare hypotheek, en aangezien de race tussen de schuldeisers wordt beslecht op die dag, hebben latere gebeurtenissen geen invloed op de rangschikking tussen de schuldeisers. Veel juristen zouden deze casus in die zin oplossen en studenten zouden voor dit antwoord goede punten krijgen (maar deze casus zou zeker niet de moeilijkste vraag op het examen zijn).

Komen we evenwel tot het cassatiearrest van 28 april 2025. Met dit arrest, en in zeer duidelijke bewoordingen, besluit het Hof van Cassatie tot een totaal andere uitkomst. De kernoverwegingen van het Hof luiden als volgt:

Il suit de la combinaison de ces dispositions que, si le jugement déclaratif de faillite entraîne le dessaisissement du débiteur et fait naître un concours entre les créanciers, seuls les droits des créanciers chirographaires et privilégiés généraux sont cristallisés au jour de la faillite.

Il s’ensuit que, lorsque le délai de validité de l’inscription hypothécaire prise par un créancier expire après le jugement déclaratif de la faillite du débiteur, ce créancier est tenu de procéder au renouvellement de son inscription pour conserver son droit de préférence jusqu’à ce qu’il soit reporté sur le prix du bien hypothéqué.

De zekerheid van de samenloop blijkt plots niet zo zeker te zijn voor de hypothecaire schuldeiser (en bij uitbreiding andere titularissen van bijzondere zekerheden). Vanuit doctrinair oogpunt laat dit arrest zich maar moeilijk inpassen in de theorie van het insolventierecht, zoals deze de voorbije decennia gaandeweg vorm heeft gekregen (zie, E. Dirix, Van alle markten. Liber Amicorum Eddy Wymeersch, 2008, p. 415, nr. 4 (met verwijzing naar Thomas Jackson): “Wat de zakelijke zekerheidsrechten betreft, is de opening van de procedure het moment waarop hun faillissementsbestendigheid moet worden vastgesteld en hun rangorde bepaald.“).

Sire, er is geen samenloop meer.

Edit – met toevoeging van het arrest, zoals gepubliceerd na de initiële post.

Cass 28 april 2025Download

Multiple voting shares in listed companies in Belgium

Discussion of a new policy proposal

Multiple voting shares have been prohibited for listed companies in Belgium for a long time. This will, however, be (partly) subject to change as the Belgian legislator is required to implement the Multiple-Vote Share Structures Directive (‘MVS Directive’). In this blog post, we will discuss the policy proposal of a working group within the Belgian Centre for Company Law (BCV-CDS) that offers advice to the Belgian legislator on transposing the MVS Directive and aims to facilitate a broader policy reform (full proposal available here). This fascinating topic will also be discussed at the Conference on Loyalty and Multiple Voting Rights in Europe, which will take place on the afternoon of 15 May 2025 at the University of Antwerp (Antwerp) (more information on the conference website).

MVS Directive

In December 2024, the EU adopted the MVS Directive[1], as part of the broader EU Listing Act package. The MVS Directive aims to facilitate access to capital markets for SME companies and requires that member states allow multiple voting shares in companies that seek admission to the trading on a multilateral trading facility (‘MTF’). The idea is that the attractiveness of listing on a capital market increases, as multiple voting shares allow the controlling shareholders to retain control over the company while raising funds from the public. 

In the case of Belgium, the transposition of the MVS Directive requires a change of stance towards multiple voting shares. Under current Belgian company law, it is prohibited for companies listed on a regulated market or MTF to issue multiple voting shares. They only have the possibility to adopt loyalty voting shares, which grant double voting rights to shareholders who have held their shares in registered form for at least two years. Therefore, Belgian law will need to be updated, (at least) allowing multiple voting shares for companies that seek a listing on an MTF (in Belgium: Euronext Access and Euronext Growth). 

However, the MVS Directive also offers the opportunity for a broader policy debate on the desirability of multiple voting shares for companies listed on regulated markets. To offer advice to the Belgian legislator on the implementation of the MVS Directive, a working group within the Belgian Centre for Company Law[2] has drafted a comprehensive policy proposal, which is available on the website of the Centre. 

In short, this policy proposal encompasses a broader reform of multiple voting shares and is based on three overarching principles: (i) it extends the scope of the reform to allow multiple voting shares not only for companies that seek listing on an MTF, but also for companies that seek listing on a  regulated market or that are already listed on an MTF or regulated market, (ii) it allows companies flexibility to design a multiple voting share structure in line with their needs, while also protecting minority shareholders when multiple voting shares are adopted by an already listed company (“midstream” adoption), and (iii) it adapts certain existing rules to make them more compatible with the new possibility for companies to adopt multiple voting shares.

Multiple voting shares for companies listed on a regulated market 

In the first place, the working group advises the Belgian legislator to extend the scope of the reform and allow multiple voting shares for companies that seek listing on a regulated market. The proposed extension of the scope is based on several arguments.

First, limiting the reform to MTFs will likely have a small effect on the attractiveness of stock exchange listings in Belgium, given the small size of both MTF markets in Belgium. Second, allowing multiple voting shares for MTFs, but not for regulated markets, would limit the possibility of ‘uplisting’ (i.e. transferring from trading on an MTF to trading on a regulated market). Third, the competitiveness of Belgium as an incorporation destination for listed companies requires that Belgium keeps up with the trend in other countries that already allow multiple voting shares for companies listed on a regulated market. 

Underlying these arguments is the working group’s belief that multiple voting shares could be valuable for at least some listed companies. Indeed, multiple voting shares can facilitate controlling shareholders to take their company public while retaining control over the company. Such controlling shareholders may have good incentives to monitor management and engage in long-term value creation due to their large share participation. At the same time, multiple voting shares entrench controlling shareholders and decouple their cash flow and voting rights, which may increase their incentives to extract private benefits, at the cost of the overall shareholder value. Nevertheless, on balance, the working group believes that companies should be free to decide on their optimal governance structure, including on the use of multiple voting shares. 

Maximum multiplicator of 1:20

Furthermore, the MVS Directive requires member states to adopt either of two safeguards to protect the interests of minority shareholders: a maximum voting ratio or the neutralization of the multiple voting rights for certain decisions of the general meeting that require a qualified majority. 

The working group recommends adopting a maximum voting ratio of 1:20: such a voting ratio is deemed high enough to be attractive, whilst being low enough to ensure that controlling shareholders retain some financial ‘skin in the game’. The second safeguard was deemed less appropriate, as it would detract from the purpose of the reform and harm the attractiveness of listing with multiple voting shares.    

In addition, the MVS Directive provides the possibility for member states to impose additional safeguards, such as sunset clauses which convert the multiple voting rights into normal voting rights under specific circumstances or after a designated period of time.  Although a sunset clause may make sense for some companies, and companies should be free to adopt such a clause, the working group opposes the idea of introducing a mandatory sunset clause. Indeed, it would be difficult to design a sunset clause that fits the needs of all companies. Moreover, sunset clauses diminish the controlling shareholders’ certainty that they will be able to retain their control over the company, which may discourage them from taking the company public in the first place.

Midstream adoption of multiple voting shares

Even though the scope of the MVS Directive is limited to companies that seek listing (on an MTF) for the first time, the working group recommends to also make it possible for multiple voting shares to be introduced when a company is already listed on a regulated market or MTF (i.e. ‘midstream’ adoption). Multiple voting shares may become useful during the lifecycle of the company, for example, when a cash-constrained controlling shareholder wants to raise additional capital to finance investment without losing control over the company. Moreover, since the Belgian companies that are already listed never had the opportunity to adopt multiple voting shares before the reform, banning midstream introductions of multiple voting shares would create an uneven playing field between companies that were already listed at the time of the reform and those that were not. 

However, the working group recognizes that there are significant risks to the midstream adoption of multiple voting shares. Multiple voting shares may be primarily extractive in some companies, and such risk of an inefficient midstream adoption may not have been discounted into the stock price, as multiple voting shares were banned. In addition, unlike at the moment of the IPO, when shareholders are free to invest in a company with multiple voting shares, the midstream adoption of multiple voting shares will likely not be approved by all shareholders. 

Nevertheless, the working group considers that the risks associated with midstream adoptions of multiple voting shares do not justify a complete ban but only require sufficient safeguards. To protect minority shareholders, the proposal provides that multiple voting shares can only be introduced – either through the issuance of new shares or an amendment to the articles of association – with the approval of a qualified majority of the disinterested shareholders. This would prevent the beneficiaries of the multiple voting rights, typically the controlling shareholders, from approving the midstream adoption of multiple voting shares unilaterally. 

Amendments to the loyalty voting shares regime 

Finally, the working group proposes some changes to the regime for loyalty voting shares. Currently, loyalty voting shares can be introduced with a lower majority threshold than regular amendments to the articles of association (two-thirds majority instead of 75% majority). This has led to the situation where loyalty voting shares have been introduced in the midstream phase supported by the existing reference shareholders (who tend to benefit from loyalty voting rights) but without the approval of minority shareholders. To better protect minority shareholders, the working group proposes to increase the majority requirement to a regular 75% majority. 

The working group also proposes that loyalty voting shares and multiple voting shares (if they were to be allowed) cannot be combined. The reason is to avoid abuses and to increase the transparency of each system. 

Conclusion

The policy proposal drafted by the working group within the Belgian Centre for Company Law aims to launch the debate on the implementation of the MVS Directive in Belgium and the desirability of a more flexible legal framework for multiple voting shares in Belgium. In addition, the introduction of multiple voting shares also requires technical changes to several other rules, such as the rules on amendment of class rights (article 7:155 BCCA), preferential subscription rights (article 7:188 BCCA), capital increases (article 7:193 BCCA) and mandatory bids (article 5 and 74 Takeover Law). We aim to discuss these proposals for technical changes in future blogposts.

We welcome feedback on this policy proposal, which can be found on the website of the Belgian Centre for Company Law (BCV-CDS).

We also invite you to discuss this topic with us during the conference on “Loyalty and Multiple Voting Rights in Europe”, which will take place on the afternoon of 15 May 2025 at the University of Antwerp (Antwerp) (more information on the conference website).

Carl Clottens, Steven Declercq, Jeroen Delvoie, Stijn Deschepper, Thierry L’Homme, Theo Monnens, Michiel Stuyts, Tom Vos and Marieke Wyckaert

[1] Directive (EU) 2024/2810 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek admission to trading of their shares on a multilateral trading facility, OJ L 2810, 14 November 2024. 

[2] The working group consists of (in alphabetic order) Carl Clottens, Steven Declercq, Jeroen Delvoie, Stijn Deschepper, Thierry L’Homme, Theo Monnens, Michiel Stuyts, Tom Vos and Marieke Wyckaert.