Trusts can be considered to be ‘entities’ which can come under the scope of the freedom of establishment
On September 14th 2017, the CJEU ruled on the Panayi Trust case (Case C-646/15), to which we have already referred in an earlier blog post. The CJEU’s ruling in the Panayi Trust case will provide ample opportunity for debate and reflection in the near future, especially with Brexit coming into view.
However, in this blog post we will restrict ourselves to a brief presentation of the case and some first observations regarding the question whether trusts can indeed come under the scope of the freedom of establishment. Continue reading “Trust and freedom of establishment: some preliminary observations on the CJEU’s ruling in the Panayi Trust case”
BBC podcast by economist Tim Harford
The well known BBC podcast by Tim Harford on 50 inventions, ideas and innovations which have helped create the economic world focuses this week on the limited liability company. This recommended podcast tells in 9 minutes the importance of limited liability for the pooling of capital and introduces the listener through (a somewhat anglocentric) history of the limited liability company to economic concepts such as agency cost.
See for other historic views on the company previous posts on:
Editoriaal over beslag op aandelen door Joeri Vananroye en Bram Van Baelen (TRV 2017, 391)
In het laatste nummer van het TRV schreven Vananroye en Van Baelen een editoriaal over beslag op aandelen. Dit thema kwam op deze blog ook reeds herhaaldelijk aan bod (hier, hier, hier en hier). Beslag op aandelen wordt er beschreven als een manier om persoonlijke schuldeisers liquiditeit te verschaffen, zonder liquidatie van de vennootschap.
Naast liquidatie en beslag op aandelen is er nog een derde model om aandeelhouders en hun persoonlijke schuldeisers liquiditeit te verschaffen: Continue reading “Scheidingsaandeel bij uittreding: vergeet ook de persoonlijke schuldeisers niet”
In a recent paper Danielle D’Onfro (Washington University Law) argues that security interests are best understood as a form of “limited liability property”. Limited liability, i.e. the privilege of being legally shielded from liability that would normally apply, has long been considered the quintessential feature of equity interests. The author convincingly argues, however, that limited liability is a critical feature of security interests as well. Debt and equity are indeed not the opposites they are sometimes believed to be. The paper will soon be published in Cardozo Law Review and can already be consulted here.
Regels inzake minimumkapitaal zijn makkelijk na te komen en af te dwingen
Een eerdere post had het over het verplicht minimumkapitaal. Niet-aansprakelijkheid van de aandeelhouder wordt door het bestaan van een verplichte en achtergestelde inbreng “beperkte aansprakelijkheid”. Zeker voor kleine vennootschappen met een controlerende aandeelhouder is de prikkel die het wettelijk minimumkapitaal met zich brengt reëel.
Het minimumkapitaal is niet langer en vogue in de doctrine. Continue reading “Soms is lomp slim”
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (LSE) on link between formation rules and the development of capital markets
An earlier post (in Dutch) discussed the risk of moral hazard when limited liability allows company owners to take excessive risks without needing to fear personal losses. This goes to the expense of company creditors. Minimum capital requirements were suggested as a remedy since this raises the stakes for company owners and thus discourages excessive behavior.
A recent analysis of corporate and financial regulation in Britain and Germany in the 19th century argues, however, that stringent formation rules, such as minimum capital requirements, could possibly hamper the development of financial markets (see: C. Gerner-Beuerle, ‘Law and Finance in Emerging Economies: Germany and Britain 1800-1900, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 80 Iss. 2, March 2017, 263-298).
Continue reading “The effect of formation rules on the functioning of capital markets: lessons from history”
One of the very first posts on this blog related to the publication of the inaugural lecture of prof. dr. Rolef de Weijs on the occasion of his appointment as professor of National and International Insolvency Law at the University of Amsterdam’s (UvA) Faculty of Law. In this lecture, the position of shareholders in insolvency law is critically examined. Until recently, insolvency was all about creditors (company law, on the other hand, was all about shareholders). The lecture by prof. de Weijs clearly demonstrates the need for insolvency law to also take into account the position of shareholders. Debt and equity go hand in hand, also – and especially – in times of insolvency. On a more general level, the lecture illustrates the absence of real borders between company law and insolvency law. An (updated) English translation of the lecture can now be found here.