In de financiering van ondernemingen neemt de achtergestelde schuldvordering een belangrijke plaats in, tussen kapitaal en schuld. In zijn recent gepubliceerde proefschrift heeft Roel Fransis (KUL) de achtergestelde schuldvordering aan een minitieus onderzoek onderworpen, zowel wat de juridische aard van deze rechtsfiguur betreft als de rechtsgevolgen ervan, in het bijzonder in het kader van insolventieprocedures. Met dit proefschrift heeft Roel Fransis, in de woorden van zijn promotor (Eric Dirix, KUL), “een fundamenteel werk afgeleverd dat onze kennis op vele terreinen van het verbintenissen-, goederenrecht en insolventierecht werkelijk vooruit helpt en dat tevens voor de rechtspraktijk van onschatbare waarde zal blijken te zijn”. Met deze beoordeling kan alleen maar ingestemd worden.
In a recent paper Danielle D’Onfro (Washington University Law) argues that security interests are best understood as a form of “limited liability property”. Limited liability, i.e. the privilege of being legally shielded from liability that would normally apply, has long been considered the quintessential feature of equity interests. The author convincingly argues, however, that limited liability is a critical feature of security interests as well. Debt and equity are indeed not the opposites they are sometimes believed to be. The paper will soon be published in Cardozo Law Review and can already be consulted here.
One of the very first posts on this blog related to the publication of the inaugural lecture of prof. dr. Rolef de Weijs on the occasion of his appointment as professor of National and International Insolvency Law at the University of Amsterdam’s (UvA) Faculty of Law. In this lecture, the position of shareholders in insolvency law is critically examined. Until recently, insolvency was all about creditors (company law, on the other hand, was all about shareholders). The lecture by prof. de Weijs clearly demonstrates the need for insolvency law to also take into account the position of shareholders. Debt and equity go hand in hand, also – and especially – in times of insolvency. On a more general level, the lecture illustrates the absence of real borders between company law and insolvency law. An (updated) English translation of the lecture can now be found here.
A post by guest blogger Nicolaes W.A. Tollenaar
Legislation is currently being prepared, at both the European and the national levels, to introduce proceedings that aim to rescue ailing businesses before formal insolvency proceedings are begun. Such proceedings are commonly referred to as “pre-insolvency” proceedings. They provide for the right, outside formal insolvency proceedings, to propose a restructuring plan to creditors and other capital providers that, under certain circumstances, can be imposed upon opposing parties.
On 22 November 2016, as part of the Action Plan for a Capital Markets Union, the EC published a draft directive on preventive restructuring frameworks which, upon adoption, will compel the Member States to introduce pre-insolvency proceedings into their national systems. At the same time, the Dutch Government is working on a draft of the Continuity of Enterprises Act (Voorontwerp Wet Continuïteit Onderneming II), which seeks to introduce pre-insolvency proceedings in the Netherlands.
Dr. Nicolaes Tollenaar has kindly provided us with the following summary of his recent research regarding the normative foundation and framework of such pre-insolvency proceedings.
This week the (already) third edition of the influential book The Anatomy of Corporate Law was published by Oxford University Press. The book provides the reader with a solid framework to understand corporate law from a comparative perspective. The following key jurisdictions are covered: US, UK, Brazil, Italy, France, Germany, and Japan. The general structure of the previous editions is maintained. The quality of the authors guarantees the quality of the work.
Een post door gastblogger Simon Landuyt
Debt and equity have in common that they are both provided to a company by an investor in return for a claim on its assets. For the creditor, the claim and the repayment date are fixed. On the other hand, the shareholder is a residual claimant. He will, in principle, only receive from the company to the extent the company’s assets exceed its liabilities. As a consequence, the claim of the shareholder is subordinated to the claim of the creditor. Therefore, at least in certain jurisdictions, it often happens that creditors or bankruptcy trustees try to qualify or “recharacterize” a rather vague financial contract of (another) investor into equity once the company gets into difficulties.
The technique of securitization was at the heart of the financial crisis (for a primer on securitization, read here). Originally a sound instrument to mitigate risk, the standards of the securitization process degraded in the years leading up to the financial crisis, which contributed to excessive credit growth in and outside of the formal banking system (read here). Continue reading “Secutarization and post-crisis financial regulation”