Category: EU law

A cost-free reparation loan that costs billions and reconstructs nothing

A critical look by Veerle Colaert and Paul Dermine at the wrangling over the Russian assets held at Euroclear

While Trump’s original peace plan appears to be off the table, his proposal to create an investment fund with Russian assets at Euroclear continues to reverberate. Many European leaders are now calling even more forcefully for these assets to be transferred to Ukraine without delay, before the Trump administration mobilises them with its own agenda – and for its own benefit.

The urge to act quickly is understandable, but it is at least as important to keep a cool head. The United States clearly cannot seize the Russian assets held at Euroclear without the EU’s consent. And the reasons for the EU to leave those assets untouched remain as compelling as ever.

Continue reading “A cost-free reparation loan that costs billions and reconstructs nothing”

The SFDR II Proposal: An Overview

A post by Dr. Arnaud Van Caenegem

The European Commission published its proposal for amending the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) on 20 November 2025, accompanied by a Q&A. The proposal also explicitly amends the PRIIPS Regulation and is understood to implicitly “moot” certain provisions of the Taxonomy Regulation that reference the SFDR.

The SFDR has been discussed in a previous post as a disclosure regulation, adopted with the objective to harmonize the provision of sustainability-related information in individual and collective investment activities by financial market participants, financial advisers and financial products. The Commission proposal introduces a second objective: the creation of a harmonized categorization of sustainability-related products.

This post covers the three key proposed changes: a substantial reduction of the obligations for financial market participants, a limitation of the scope to “collective investment”, and a shift from a disclosure to a categorization framework.

Continue reading “The SFDR II Proposal: An Overview”

The EU Proposal for Pre-packs with Related Parties – some critical notes and essential amendments

A post by Rolef de Weijs and Flip Schreurs

1. Harmonization of Pre-packs 

The European Union seeks to harmonize European Insolvency Law. It has proposed a Directive for the harmonisation of certain aspects of insolvency law across Member States, including pre-packs.[1] The Commission’s ambition is to have this Proposal for a European pre-pack adopted as a Directive already by January 2026 (“the Proposal”).[2]

A pre-pack is a prepared insolvency procedure in which the sale of the business to a new owner is arranged prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings. Normally, this sale process takes place in a closed bidding environment and even in secrecy, in order not to disrupt the business and to ensure value maximization for creditors. Once the company is declared insolvent, the first thing that will typically happen is that the court appointed trustee will transfer the business to the highest bidder coming out of the sale process.[3]

Pre-packs have a tainted reputation, at least in jurisdictions where they are being used.[4] In part this is due to the highly legal nature of a pre-pack which overrides what people see in the street. In case of a prepack, a company as legal entity is declared insolvent by the court, but the business uninterruptedly continues to operate with a new owner. Creditors can no longer pursue their claim against the business (which is transferred to the new owner) and will have to file their claim with the trustee of the bankrupt entity. As long as pre-packs are conducted with outside parties, there is however little room for abuse. The procedure would then simply seek to ensure that the business is sold to the highest bidder in the interest of the joint creditors.[5] The prevention of damage caused by disruption by ensuring a confidential preparation only maximizes value. If this is what the pre-pack is all about, there is little cause for the tainted reputation.

Continue reading “The EU Proposal for Pre-packs with Related Parties – some critical notes and essential amendments”

The 28th Company Law Regime – paper by the Belgian Centre of Company Law

This Belgian Centre of Company Law (‘BCCL’) has published a paper with feedback on the ideas for a 28th Company Law Regime, as part of the Consultation which the Commission has organized on this topic.

BCV_CDS_28th Regime_20250926Download

The BCCL is a non-profit organization bringing together virtually all Belgian corporate law scholars and various Belgian corporate law practitioners with an academic affiliation.

Multiple voting rights vs. loyalty shares: exploring how Belgium’s governance framework might evolve

Belgian companies whose shares are listed on a regulated market or an MTF are currently not allowed to issue ‘true’ multiple voting rights shares (MVS). With the adoption of the Belgian Code on Companies and Associations (BCCA) in 2019, the legislator (re)introduced the possibility for non-listed companies to create MVS, but this option remained unavailable for listed companies. Instead, Article 7:53 of the BCCA only allows listed Belgian companies to include a provision in their articles of association for so-called ‘loyalty’ voting rights shares (LVS), which grant an extra vote per share to shareholders who have continuously held their shares in registered form for at least two years (and provided that the shares are fully paid-up)[1].

Five years since its introduction, the Belgian LVS regime has not quite delivered on its promise of strengthening long-term shareholder engagement in listed companies: its practical uptake has been modest, and its benefits largely concentrated among controlling shareholders[2]. Compared to MVS, the effectiveness of LVS as a control-enhancing mechanism is limited by the fact that (i) it only grants one additional vote per share and (ii) this additional vote is lost when the share is transferred (with limited exceptions). Moreover, LVS have not really contributed to more initial or secondary public offerings but have mainly allowed controlling shareholders to reduce their capital investment while maintaining the same level of voting control.

As part of the EU’s broader effort to make public capital markets more attractive, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the MVS Directive[3] requires Member States to permit MVS structures for companies listing on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). In Belgium, there is growing momentum to go beyond the MVS Directive’s minimum requirements by allowing MVS structures not only on MTFs but also on regulated markets, and by enabling their introduction not just at the IPO stage but also later (hence also for companies that are already listed today). A group of legal experts working under the auspices of the Belgian Centre for Company Law has published a detailed proposal in this sense (see “MVS proposal Belgian Centre for Company Law” and “Multiple voting shares in listed companies in Belgium”) which has received attention in the newspapers recently.[4]

Hereafter, we explore how the introduction of MVS for listed companies may impact the current LVS regime in Belgium and the proposals formulated in this regard by the aforementioned legal expert group. The LVS regime falls outside the scope of the MVS Directive since it does not involve the creation of separate share classes[5]. Nonetheless, when transposing the MVS Directive, the Belgian legislator will have to make certain important policy choices that will also affect LVS.

Continue reading “Multiple voting rights vs. loyalty shares: exploring how Belgium’s governance framework might evolve”

Juridische complexiteit: een conceptueel denkader

Ons rechtsbestel wordt al decennia geassocieerd met een groeiende complexiteit. In publieke debatten wordt gesproken over ‘regelneverij’, ‘juridische doolhoven’ en ‘overregulering’. Burgers, ondernemingen en maatschappelijke stakeholders ervaren regelgeving vaak als nodeloos ingewikkeld. Bedrijven in het bijzonder klagen over de torenhoge compliancekosten die een rem zouden zetten op innovatie en investeringen. Politici en beleidsmakers beloven steevast te streven naar vereenvoudiging en betere regelgeving.

Toch blijft de kern van de discussie vaak erg vaag. Wat wordt net bedoeld met de vaststelling dat ons recht ‘ingewikkeld’ of ‘complex’ is. Wat bedoelen we met complexiteit in juridische zin? Bestaat er een objectieve maatstaf? Is complexiteit altijd negatief? En zijn eenvoudige regels een realistische doelstelling of een onhaalbaar ideaalbeeld?

In mijn bijdrage ‘A Conceptual Framework on Legal Complexity’ bied ik een conceptueel raamwerk aan dat juridische complexiteit multidimensionaal benadert, onderscheid maakt tussen systeemniveau en regelniveau, en inzichtelijk maakt welke trade-offs schuilgaan achter pogingen tot vereenvoudiging. Het artikel illustreert dit met voorbeelden uit het Belgische vennootschapsrecht, maar de analyse is naar mijn mening transversaal toepasbaar op alle rechtsdomeinen.

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Reshaping control: the Multiple Voting Shares Directive and its potential impact on the Belgian rules on public takeover bids

A post by Carl Clottens and Göktug Celik (NautaDutilh)

On 4 December 2024, as part of the so-called Listing Act package, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2024/2810 on multiple voting share structures, commonly known as the MVS Directive. This directive requires EU Member States to allow companies seeking admission to trading on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) to introduce or maintain multiple voting share structures, provided that certain safeguards are respected (see “Europese richtlijn betreffende meervoudig stemrecht voor genoteerde vennootschappen gepubliceerd – Corporate Finance Lab”).

A group of legal experts working under auspices of the Belgian Centre for Company Law has used the MVS Directive as a starting point for proposing a comprehensive and more far-reaching reform of multiple voting rights in Belgian listed companies (see “MVS proposal Belgian Centre for Company Law”) . The main elements of this proposal have already been set out in an earlier blogpost (see “Multiple voting shares in listed companies in Belgium”).

Continue reading “Reshaping control: the Multiple Voting Shares Directive and its potential impact on the Belgian rules on public takeover bids”

Loyalty- and multiple voting shares and regulatory competition in the EU

Following the special issue on loyalty- and multiple voting shares in European Company Law

European company law seems to be divided in two camps on how to regulate loyalty‑ and multiple‑voting shares: rule‑heavy ex ante regimes and flexible (and uncertain) ex post models. This blog post summarizes the new special issue of European Company Law, where seven country studies map recent developments in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom and analyse the race to attract IPOs. The discussion highlights the different approaches and shifting voting caps, sunset clauses and minority safeguards.

Continue reading “Loyalty- and multiple voting shares and regulatory competition in the EU”

Liability for competition law infringements within groups: beware of misbehaving family members

A post by guest blogger Charlotte Reyns (Quinz, KU Leuven)

Since the introduction of the EU Private Damages Directive 2014/104, the amount of private damages actions following competition law infringements have grown exponentially. Indeed, enforcement by private parties is viewed as a complementary limb to the enforcement of competition law by the European Commission and the national competition authorities. One aspect that deserves special attention in that regard is the “single economic unit” doctrine which allows several or all companies belonging to a group of companies to be held liable for an infringement of competition law they did not themselves commit. Recent rulings such as Athenian Brewery (C-393/23) in the context of private international law and ILVA (C-383/23) with regard to liability for infringements of the GDPR furthermore showcase the far-reaching implications of the single economic unit doctrine.

This post delves deeper into the possible liability of the different members of a group of companies when only one of them has been found to infringe EU competition law. Who can be liable, and how to manage this risk?

Continue reading “Liability for competition law infringements within groups: beware of misbehaving family members”

Nieuwe Europese vennootschapsrichtlijn 2025/25: meer dan digitalisering

Een post door gastbloggers Alain François en Mauro Gisgand (Eubelius)

Op 30 januari 2025 trad de Richtlijn 2025/25 rond het gebruik van digitale instrumenten en processen in het vennootschapsrecht in werking.  Deze Richtlijn brengt niet alleen vernieuwende maatregelen rond digitalisering, maar introduceert ook ingrijpende veranderingen voor de in België veelgebruikte Vennootschap Onder Firma (“VOF”) en Commanditaire Vennootschap (“CommV”).

De Belgische wetgever heeft de tijd tot 31 juli 2027 om deze richtlijn om te zetten in nationaal recht, en tot 1 augustus 2028 om ze in de praktijk toe te passen. Voor een beperkt aantal artikelen geldt een langere omzettingstermijn tot 1 augustus 2029.

We belichten enkele van de belangrijkste nieuwigheden. 

Continue reading “Nieuwe Europese vennootschapsrichtlijn 2025/25: meer dan digitalisering”

A European Central Bank Standing Guard over a European Currency Union

A post by guest blogger Jan Meyers (Cleary Gottlieb)

            A good while ago, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, I wrote my doctoral thesis at Stanford about the possible design of a more integrated European monetary system. It was then still a somewhat nebulous prospect amidst experiments with semi-fixed exchange rate arrangements between participating European currencies (the “snake-in-the-dollar-tunnel”, then “le serpent dans l’espace” and, eventually, ERM I) following the unravelling of the Bretton Woods gold-dollar standard. Fast forward to the present: a genuine European central bank has been standing guard over a genuine European currency union for 25 years, steering it through a succession of turbulences. It has been and continues to be a fascinating story, with several plot twists and an abundance of intriguing questions. I could not resist the temptation of writing another book about it. It has actually been a joy writing it.

            The book revisits the architecture of the European currency union as it continues to evolve in Europe’s incomplete EMU and now faces today’s concurrent challenges posed by government debt sustainability concerns and the considerable public expenditures, investments and reforms needed in particular to address climate change and the green transition, population ageing, the changing landscape of global trade and the rebuilding of credible defense capability.

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Duurzaamheid beoordelen kan binnenkort niet langer zonder vergunning

Een post door gastbloggers Chloë De Somviele & Lisa Nelis

Toegang tot kwalitatieve duurzaamheidsdata is al langer een pijnpunt wanneer beleggers rekening willen houden met de ecologische, sociale en governance (ESG) factoren van bedrijven.[1] Correcte informatie over ESG-factoren neemt aan belang toe in de financiële sector om de risico’s en investeringsopportuniteiten ten gevolge van de energietransitie, klimaattransitie en sociale uitdagingen accuraat in rekening te brengen. Bedrijven die ondernemingen op basis van ESG-factoren beoordelen en rangschikken, ook wel ESG-ratingagentschappen genoemd, zijn daarin essentieel maar ook problematisch, aangezien bijvoorbeeld onduidelijk is welke ESG-criteria zij hanteren, welke ESG-criteria zwaarder doorwegen, en hoe ESG-informatie wordt verzameld.  

De Europese Unie regelt reeds bepaalde delen van de beleggingsketen die uitvoerig op deze blog werden besproken, zoals wanneer een economische activiteit ecologisch duurzaam is, over welke duurzaamheidsinformatie bedrijven moeten rapporteren, hoe informatie over duurzaamheid in precontractuele en periodieke documenten van financiële producten moeten worden opgenomen, en hoe in de distributie van financiële instrumenten gevraagd moet worden naar duurzaamheidsvoorkeuren. Uitgevers van ESG-ratings bleven voorlopig buiten schot. Woensdag 24 april keurde het Europees Parlement een compromistekst van februari 2024 goed. Daarmee ligt nu de verordening van toepassing op ESG-ratings ter stemming voor bij de Europese Raad. Hieronder bespreken we de tekst van het akkoord tussen het Europees Parlement en de Raad zoals die door het Parlement werd goedgekeurd.[2]

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EU bereikt langverwacht akkoord over de Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: Hoe groen is dit groen licht?

Een post door gastblogger Liselot Vandenberghe

Op vrijdag 15 maart keurde het Coreper[1] (en in die zin de Raad) de Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD)[2] goed. Tegen de verwachtingen in werd vlak voor de eindmeet, zijnde de Europese verkiezingen in juni, een compromis bereikt dat op de steun van voldoende lidstaten kon rekenen. Dit compromis werd moeizaam bereikt na vele concessies voorgesteld door het Belgisch EU-voorzitterschap en een toch wel aanzienlijke verwatering van de behoorlijk controversiële Richtlijn. Hieronder volgt een korte bespreking van de essentie van de Richtlijn en de belangrijkste last-minute wijzigingen.

Continue reading “EU bereikt langverwacht akkoord over de Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: Hoe groen is dit groen licht?”

Van onze verslaggever ter plaatse: wetontwerp omzetting Herstructureringsrichtlijn goedgekeurd

De plenaire vergadering van de Kamer keurde vanavond goed: het Wetsontwerp “tot omzetting van Richtlijn (EU) 2019/1023 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 20 juni 2019 betreffende preventieve herstructureringsstelsels, betreffende kwijtschelding van schuld en beroepsverboden, en betreffende maatregelen ter verhoging van de efficiëntie van procedures inzake herstructurering, insolventie en kwijtschelding van schuld, en tot wijziging van Richtlijn (EU) 2017/1132 en houdende diverse bepalingen inzake insolvabiliteit”.

Schrijf hier in voor de disputatio van volgende week donderdag 1 juni.

De (on)zin van commerciële vs. particuliere schuldkwijtschelding

Over de aanmoediging van ondernemerschap als leitmotiv voor tweedekansbeleid – een post door gastblogger Gauthier Vandenbossche (UGent)

Niet alle EU-lidstaten behandelen ondernemers en consumenten op dezelfde manier wanneer het op tweedekansbeleid en schuldkwijtschelding aankomt. Zo maakt het Belgische insolventierecht, net zoals het Franse insolventierecht, een onderscheid tussen natuurlijke personen op basis van hun beroeps- of economische activiteit. Maar moet er op dat vlak wel een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen natuurlijke personen? En kan een dergelijk onderscheid verantwoord worden op basis van de doelstelling van tweedekansbeleid en schuldkwijtschelding?

“Er kunnen vraagtekens worden gezet bij het verschil tussen de ‘risico-nemende’ ondernemer, voor wie een soepel tweedekansbeleid zou bestaan, en andere natuurlijke personen.”

– Gauthier Vandenbossche

Continue reading “De (on)zin van commerciële vs. particuliere schuldkwijtschelding”