Category: *In English

Akzo Nobel: Activist Shareholders Hit Wall of Dutch Stakeholder Model

An analysis by Tom Vos & Thom Wetzer

An attempt at courtship has ended up in court. Over the past months, US paints and coatings giant PPG Industries (‘PPG’) has tried to woe the management and shareholders of Dutch rival Akzo Nobel (‘Akzo’) with friendly takeover offers. It has been rewarded by a consistently aloof response from Akzo’s boards, and especially its Chairman Antony Burgmans, who has so far refused to enter talks. On May 29, the Enterprise Chamber of Amsterdam (a Dutch commercial court) rejected efforts by some of Akzo’s shareholders, led by activist investor Elliott Management Corp. (‘Elliott’), to force a shareholder vote intended to oust Mr. Burgmans.

The case comes at a critical time in what has become an increasingly bitter exchange. Akzo has so far rejected three unsolicited friendly offers from PPG, arguing that they undervalue the company, do not make any serious commitments to its stakeholders, demonstrate a cultural lack of understanding, and entail significant risks and uncertainties (including lengthy reviews by the EU’s competition authority). Continue reading “Akzo Nobel: Activist Shareholders Hit Wall of Dutch Stakeholder Model”

New books on international insolvency law

International insolvency law can be found on national, European and international level. Under the guidance of Yves Brulard, a group of authors have written two volumes on international insolvency law (in French). The first volume deals with the Insolvency Regulation (Recast),  which shall apply from 26 June 2017. The second volume deals with national rules on international insolvency law, in a selected number of jurisdictions. The books can be ordered here, and are highly recommended.

Uncitral Working Group V: Insolvency Law

At its fifty-first session (10-19 May 2017), Uncitral Working Group V has agreed to a draft model law on the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments (which can be consulted here) and to draft legislative provisions to facilitate the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups (which can be consulted here).

EU company law: public consultation on rules on digital solutions and efficient cross-border operations

The European Commission recently opened a public consultation to collect input from stakeholders on problems in company law, gather evidence of such problems and ask their views on possible solutions on how to address the problems at EU level. The consultation focuses on the use of online tools throughout the companies’ lifecycle, the cross-border mobility of companies (again) and (the need for) conflict-of-law rules for companies (a recent study on the law applicable to companies, can be consulted here). Continue reading “EU company law: public consultation on rules on digital solutions and efficient cross-border operations”

The principal-cost theory: a revolution in the debate on corporate law and governance?

Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire develop a new model for corporate governance in the Columbia Law Review

In a recently published papaer (here and here), commented on the Oxford Business Law Blog, a new theory of corporate governance is offered, referred to as the principal-cost theory. The theory challenges the theoretical foundations of the traditional agency-cost theory, in particular their one-size-fits-all policy recommendations.

The authors claim that the principal-cost theory demonstrates that the governance structure reducing control costs varies by firm. Lawmakers therefore should avoid one-size-fits all solutions. Rather they should seek to grow the menu of governance-structure. Accordingly, each firm could establish a governance mechanism adapted to its specific needs.

Does that mean that the agency-cost theory should be neglected from now on? Not necessarily. According to the authors, agent costs and principal costs are two sides of the same coin:

“Any reallocation of control rights between shareholders and managers decreases one type of bust, but will  increase the other,  The rate of substitution is firm-specific, driven by factors such as business strategy, industry, and the personal characteristics of the key parties.”

Only time will tell whether this theory of principal costs marks the end of an era dominated by a uniform  theory of “good” corporate governance.

 

Roel Verheyden

Lessons from history: the emergence of the corporate form

Dari-Mattiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker & Perotti in the Journal of Law, Economics & Organization on the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)

In a recent article, published in the Journal of Law, Economics & Organization (the article can be consulted here), DARI-MATTIACCI, GELDERBLOM, JONKER and PEROTTI describe the emergence of the corporate form during the 17th century. In doing so, they put important insights from other authors (HANSMANN, KRAAKMAN and SQUIRE, click here and BLAIR, click here) in an historical perspective. Professor DARI-MATTIACCI, one of the authors, held in 2015 at the KU Leuven the first Heremans Lecture on “The new economics of property rights. Unlocking the fundamental features and the historical emergence of the business corporation “, discussing a draft of this article.

Their research shows the corporate form to be a legal innovation, meeting the practical needs of oversees trade and appearing first in the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The partnership form and contractual commitments of capital did not provide the durability needed for oversees trade with Asia at the end of the 16th century. Continue reading “Lessons from history: the emergence of the corporate form”

Not all shareholders are created equal – Snap goes public with non-voting stock

A post by guest blogger Vincent Chantillon

Snap’s IPO

Academics tend to say that you can’t have your cake and eat it too, yet this is what Evan Spiegel and Robert Murphy did with Snap a few months ago. Continue reading “Not all shareholders are created equal – Snap goes public with non-voting stock”

Hit me baby one more time: does ‘ne bis in idem’ apply when company and representative are sanctioned for same offence?

ECJ judgement of April 5th 2017

Two Italian companies did not pay their VAT debt which amounted to over a million euro. In addition to a tax penalty for the companies, their legal representatives were prosecuted in their personal capacity on the ground that they failed to fulfill their responsibility to pay the VAT. The representatives protested, arguing that this would breach the ne bis in idem-principle, guaranteed by article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

Continue reading “Hit me baby one more time: does ‘ne bis in idem’ apply when company and representative are sanctioned for same offence?”

Six Months Corporate Finance Lab: taking stock

One of the highlights of 6 months of Corporate Finance Lab was the mention of the Lab by the famous insolvency scholar Professor Bob Wessels (Leiden) as one of the blogs he follows, alongside the Oxford Business Law Blog, the blog by Professor Geert Van Calster (Leuven and Monash), the International Litigation Blog en Leiden Law Blog.

Some notable posts in English include:

Legal seizure of shares: an underrated cornerstone of organizational law

A post by guest blogger Bram Van Baelen

It is a fundamental rule in many legal orders that when a debtor fails to pay his debt(s), his personal creditors can seize his assets. Legal seizure of assets is, as such, a necessary tool for creditors in order to force an unwilling debtor to fulfill his obligations. Ultimately, legal seizure can lead to a forced sale of the debtor’s assets.

When a debtor owns shares in a share capital corporation, these shares are part of the debtor’s assets as well. Just like the debtor’s house, car, or bank account, shares in corporations are available for creditors to seek recourse on for their unpaid claims. Therefore, proper legal seizure proceedings of shares are in place in order to protect the interest of personal creditors of shareholders and to consolidate this fundamental principle.

The legal seizure of shares is necessary for another reason as well. Continue reading “Legal seizure of shares: an underrated cornerstone of organizational law”

What does a legal entity know?

A post by guest blogger Branda Katan

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In civil law many rules rely for their legal effect on the presence of certain knowledge or a certain intention with one of the parties. If the party at hand is a legal entity, like a limited company, it can be difficult to determine what the entity knew. Fragments of information can be present in different parts of the organisation; an officer of the company may have gained his knowledge through his private life; he may also have a duty of confidentiality. In my doctoral thesis ‘Toerekening van kennis aan rechtspersonen’ (‘Attribution of knowledge to legal entities’), I have investigated when information that at any time is or has been available within a private legal entity qualifies as knowledge of the legal entity under Dutch law, making an in-depth comparison with German law. The thesis contains a summary in English.

Continue reading “What does a legal entity know?”

It’s the people, stupid! Individual characteristics influencing bankruptcy

A post by guest blogger Jasper Van Eetvelde

The prediction of bankruptcy, i.e. the assessment of the likelihood that a company might go bankrupt, is an important topic, with practical and legislative consequences (for an introduction to bankruptcy prediction, read here; for a recent attempt to create a global model for bankruptcy prediction, read here).  With a preventive mindset, the legislator tries to estimate this likelihood, in order to regulate accordingly. Evidently, also creditors and other interested parties try to assess whether a company they interact with is likely to enter bankruptcy proceedings.     Continue reading “It’s the people, stupid! Individual characteristics influencing bankruptcy”

The Supreme Court of the United States on the “absolute” priority rule in structured dismissals – A structural dam to stem a flood of undesirable consequences

A post by guest blogger Frederik De Leo

On 22 March 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its opinion (in the context of a Chapter 11 procedure) on the following question:

“Can a bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected creditors’ consent?”

Under the slogan: “Why step over a dollar to pick up a dime?”, the Court answers this complicated question with a simple “no”, thereby overruling the Bankruptcy Court, District Court and Third Circuit in an orderly fashion.

Continue reading “The Supreme Court of the United States on the “absolute” priority rule in structured dismissals – A structural dam to stem a flood of undesirable consequences”

MiFID II in relation to other investor protection regulation: Picking up the crumbs of a piecemeal approach

Paper by Veerle Colaert (KU Leuven)

The study of the interaction between different pieces of EU financial legislation becomes ever more important – and difficult. A recent paper by Prof. Veerle Colaert (see ssrn or academia.edu) explores the relationship between the MiFID II and other recent EU legislation aiming at investor protection, such as the Insurance Distribution Directive, the PRIIPs Regulation and the UCITS Directive.

Continue reading “MiFID II in relation to other investor protection regulation: Picking up the crumbs of a piecemeal approach”

French Constitutional Council Permits Civil, But Not Criminal Enforcement of Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law

A post by guest blogger Penelope Bergkamp

On 23 March 2017, the Constitutional council of the French Republic ruled on the constitutionality of the recently adopted Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law (hereafter “Law”). The Constitutional council held that the obligation imposed by the Law to establish a vigilance plan and the enforcement mechanisms of formal notice and injunction are not in conflict with the Constitution. Likewise, the mechanism for holding a company responsible in case of non-compliance with the obligation to establish the vigilance plan is in conformity with the Constitution. With respect to the criminal enforcement of the Law, however, the Constitutional council did identify a constitutional problem

Continue reading “French Constitutional Council Permits Civil, But Not Criminal Enforcement of Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law”