Especially after the financial crisis, many people have drawn attention to the problem of short-termism. There are many possible strategies to address this problem, including awarding additional voting rights to loyal shareholders (“loyalty voting rights”). Both France and Italy have introduced loyalty voting rights, and now the Belgian proposal for a new Companies and Associations Code also contains the possibility of loyalty voting rights in listed companies (discussed in previous blog posts here and here).
Of course, this raises the question how effective loyalty voting rights, as proposed in the Belgian Company Law Reform, are in addressing the short-termism problem. In this blog post, I argue that loyalty voting rights are unlikely to increase the holding periods of investors, as the evidence suggests that they are only used by the controlling shareholders. However, loyalty voting rights will allow a controlling shareholder to insulate itself from short-term market pressures. On the other hand, insulation also comes with the disadvantage of higher agency costs.
Therefore, I argue that loyalty voting shares are in fact nothing else than a type of control-enhancing mechanism. This implies that shareholders should be protected against midstream introductions of loyalty voting rights. On this ground, I question the wisdom of lowering the threshold to introduce loyalty voting rights, as the Belgian legislator is proposing, inspired by the French and Italian examples. In addition, I propose an additional majority for the introduction of loyalty voting rights, inspired by the idea of “majority of the minority” approval.
Bram Van Baelen behaalde met grote onderscheiding zijn Master in de Rechten aan de Faculteit Rechtsgeleerdheid van de KU Leuven (bachelor 2013-2015; master 2015-2017, major: Economisch recht/ minor: Publiekrecht) en werkt sindsdien als assistent aan het Jan Ronse Instituut voor Vennootschaps- en Financieel Recht waar hij een proefschrift voorbereidt. Tijdens het schrijven van de meesterproef was hij voorzitter van LOKO, de Leuvense Overkoepelende Kringenorganisatie.
The 2018 Heremans Lectures in Law & Economics at KU Leuven will be delivered by Professor Daniel Chen of the Toulouse School of Economics. The lectures will investigate a set of ideas related to legitimacy in law, how to formalize recognition-respect theory, and what it means for legal institutions, actors, and judges to be indifferent, such that it violates our notion of justice. The lectures will investigate how economic theory, experiments, causal inference, and machine learning can shed light on these issues.